Leveraging Cell Phones for a Distributed Electronic Warfare Defense

                    Technologies for a GPS-denied environment (Source: U.S government Accountability Office)

 

The widespread proliferation of cell phones presents a unique opportunity for a distributed, inexpensive, and adaptable counter to sophisticated electronic warfare (EW) tactics. These devices, equipped with specialized software, can form a dense network capable of detecting, identifying, and potentially mitigating various EW threats. The sheer number of cell phones in circulation provides a vast, geographically dispersed network of potential sensors and countermeasures. The software running on these devices can be rapidly updated to counter emerging EW threats, ensuring a dynamic and responsive defense.

Russian electronic warfare tactics, such as signal jamming and GPS spoofing, hinder the operation of Ukrainian drones and other equipment, even high-end U.S. weapons. Traditional methods for detecting jamming devices require expensive software-defined radios, which are often inaccessible to smaller militaries with limited budgets. A low-cost system capable of locating enemy jamming gear could provide a significant advantage to Ukrainian forces. It could also influence how cellphone network providers protect their devices from sophisticated attacks.

A U.S. company is developing a cost-effective and easily deployable system to counter Russia’s sophisticated electronic warfare tactics using networked cell phones. The Ukrainian military contacted Zephr, a company specializing in GPS-signal interference protection. Zephr sent six Android Pixel phones equipped with their software to Ukraine for field testing near the frontlines. The goal was to determine if a network of consumer phones could detect GPS jamming attempts. The tests revealed that by comparing GPS reception data from multiple phones, the network could identify when one or more devices were under attack. Many of the “spoofing” activities in Ukraine are actually powerful jamming attempts. These attempts operate on the same frequency bands as GPS, creating false satellite signals that appear to be located in impossible positions.

The U.S. military is investing heavily in alternative positioning, navigation, and timing (Alt PNT) systems to help people, drones, and other devices determine their location.

Similar to global GNSS systems, the technologies under evaluation aim to provide Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT) capabilities. These capabilities include:

  • Positioning: Determining one’s location and orientation in two or three dimensions.
  • Navigation: Planning and executing a path between the current and desired position while adjusting course, orientation, and speed.
  • Timing: Acquiring and maintaining accurate time locally or globally, including time transfer.

As the U.S Army transitions to a revamped force structure centered on human-machine integration, it must strategically select sensors and capabilities for different platforms based on mission requirements and costs. One promising alt-PNT technology for the Army is magnetic navigation (mag-nav). Mag-nav relies on mapping the Earth’s magnetic fields and is resistant to jamming and spoofing. Unlike traditional PNT systems that broadcast signals, mag-nav is a passive system, making it less vulnerable to targeting by adversaries.